

Les Platonismes de l'Antiquité Tardive

Base de données et répertoire bibliographique sur les liens entre médio- et néoplatonisme, gnosticisme, hermétisme et oracles chaldaïques

— Titre de la fiche —

◆ McGroarty, 2006, p. 65-66, Traité 46, bonheur

— Auteur principal —

Auteur moderne du commentaire et œuvre

◆ McGroarty, K., *Plotinus on Eudaimonia: A Commentary on Ennead 1.4*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Commentaire

◆ 2. 21–6 Οὐ τοίνυν τοῖς ἡδόμενοις τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὑπάρξει. . . οὐδαμοῦ δὲ κρείττον ἄλογον λόγου Then living well will not then belong to those who feel pleasure . . . and that which doesn't have reason is in no way superior to reason: (note 19: The influence of Neoplatonism on Christian philosophy has been well documented; see G. Watson, *Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion of God*, [1994]. P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin*, (1968), 106 ff. notes St Ambrose's use of Enneads I. 6 [1] and I. 8 [51] in *De Isaac* and *De Bono Mortis* respectively. Without doubt I. 4 [46] and its use in *Jacob and the Happy Life* can be added to this list. I owe this observation to Michael McHugh. See his *Jacob and the Happy Life in Saint Ambrose: Seven Exegetical Works*, [1972]. See Appendix 1. Throughout *De Jacob*, large parts of i. 4 [46] are quoted verbatim. The first passage St Ambrose borrows is the present one reproduced in *De Jacob* 1. 7. 28) Plotinus' introduction of the term pleasure in this passage causes a problem. It is difficult to decide whether he is simply using pleasure in this passage as an example of a result of sense-perception or whether he is focusing his attention on another philosophical school/s. His criticism of those who emphasize the importance of sense-perception is equally valid against those who considered pleasure to be an end. That living well will necessarily be pleasant has already been noted in lines 6 and 7 of this chapter. Van Riel (note 20: *Pleasure and the Good Life*, 106) considers this to be an attack on Epicurus. It does, indeed, seem to me that Plotinus may well have turned his attention to Epicurus who made living well exclusively dependent on sense-perception. It might of course, also, refer to the Cyrenaics, whom he included on his agenda in the final section of ch. 1. They considered pleasure to be the good (see Cicero, *De Finibus* 1. 23–30; *DL* 10. 129), and argued that sense-perception was the only criterion in the evaluation of eudaimonia. See also Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 3. 41–2 and Epicurus, *Letter to Menoecus* 129. The point being made is that a faculty ontologically superior to sense-perception is necessary to determine whether or not the object perceived is the good. In his sermon *Jacob and the Happy Life*, St Ambrose used sections of Ennead i. 4 [46]. This is the first passage that Ambrose borrowed. See Appendix 1 for a list of the passages concerned. (p. 186)

Contexte du commentaire

◆ Commentaire du Traité 46 (I, 4), § 2, 21-26.

Mots-clés

Français

- ◆ bonheur

Liens

- ◆ Plotin/Chrétiens : problématique commune aux deux auteurs.

Auteurs secondaires

Auteur ancien 1 mis en relation dans le commentaire supra cité

- ◆ Saint Ambroise , *Jacob and the Happy Life*

Datation

- ◆ Entre 340 et 397.
-

Auteur ancien 2 mis en relation dans le commentaire supra cité

- ◆ Saint Augustin (de manière générique), *Aucune oeuvre en particulier*

Datation

- ◆ Entre 204 et 270.
-

Auteur ancien 3 mis en relation dans le commentaire supra cité

- ◆ Épicure, *Lettre à Ménécée*, 129

Datation

- ◆ Entre -342 et -270.
-

Auteur ancien 4 mis en relation dans le commentaire supra cité

- ◆ Cicéron, *Les Tusculanes*, 3.41-2

Datation

- ◆ Entre -106 et -43.
-

Auteur ancien 5 mis en relation dans le commentaire supra cité

- ◆ Cicéron, *De Finibus*, 1.23-30 ; *DL* 10.129

Datation

- ◆ Entre 269 et 269.
-

Auteur ancien 6 mis en relation dans le commentaire supra cité

- ◆ Plotin, *Traité 46 (I, 4)*, *Sur le bonheur*, 2, 21-26

Datation

- ◆ Entre 269 et 270.

Passage en langue moderne

- ◆ The cause of living well then will not be pleasure, but the ability to judge that pleasure is good. For [the ability] to judge is superior to [experiencing] an affection; for it is reason or intellect; whereas pleasure is [merely an] affection, and that which doesn't have reason is in no way superior to reason.

Références complètes de la traduction

- ◆ McGroarty, K., Plotinus on Eudaimonia: A Commentary on Ennead 1.4, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Passage en langue originale

- ◆ Οὐ τοίνυν τοῖς ἡδόμενοις τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὑπάρξει, ἀλλὰ τῷ γινώσκειν δυναμένῳ, ὅτι ἡδονὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν. Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ κρίνειν δυνάμενον, ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν κρῖνον βέλτιον ἢ κατὰ πάθος· λόγος γὰρ ἢ νοῦς· ἡδονὴ δὲ πάθος· οὐδαμοῦ δὲ κρεῖττον ἄλογον λόγου.
- ◆ Plotini Opera (Editio Minor), t. I (Enn. I-III), P. Henry et H.-R. Schwyzer, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964.

— Rédaction de la fiche —

Rédacteur de la fiche

- ◆ Soares Santoprete, L. G., fiche numéro 151, 02-08-2018 18:35:34.

Comment citer cette fiche

- ◆ Soares Santoprete, L. G., *McGroarty, 2006, p. 65-66, Traité 46, bonheur, 02-08-2018 18:35:34, fiche numéro 151*, [en ligne]. Paris : CNRS, http://philognose.org/?page_id=300&idfiche=151

Imprimer

Les Platonismes de l'Antiquité Tardive

Base de données et répertoire bibliographique sur les liens entre médio- et néoplatonisme, gnosticisme, hermétisme et oracles chaldaïques

— Titre de la fiche —

- ◆ McGroarty, 2006, p. 201-204, Traité 46, bonheur, perfection

— Auteur principal —

Auteur moderne du commentaire et œuvre

- ◆ McGroarty, K., *Plotinus on Eudaimonia: A Commentary on Ennead 1.4*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Commentaire

◆ St Ambrose used Ennead I. 4 [46], Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας quite extensively in writing the sermon Jacob and the Happy Life. (note 1: This has been noted by McHugh in St. Ambrose: Seven Exegetical Works, 117 n. 5. The translation of Jacob and the Happy Life used in this Appendix is by McHugh.) The general themes of Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας can be found in book one of Jacob and the Happy Life (JHL) from ch. 6. 24 through to ch. 8. 39. Ambrose is able to employ pagan philosophy in the service of Christianity principally to demonstrate the importance of reason in the realization of perfection. Obviously Ambrose borrows only sections that can be accommodated within Christian philosophy. Below I have juxtaposed passages where Ambrose's use of Ennead I. 4 [46] is most obvious. 1. Ennead I. 4 [46] 2. 21-6: Then living well will not belong to those who feel pleasure, but to the one able to grasp that pleasure is the good. The cause of living well then will not be pleasure, but the ability to judge that pleasure is the good. For [the ability] to judge is superior to [experiencing] an affection; for it is reason or intellect; whereas pleasure is [merely an] affection, and that which doesn't have reason is in no way superior to reason JHL 1. 7. 28: For the happiness of life does not lie in bodily pleasure ... and in the mind of the man who knows that the good is also the pleasurable ... Therefore, the motive for living well is not bodily pleasure, but the mind's sagacity. For it is not the flesh, which is subject to passion, that judges, but the mind, because nothing gives more pleasure than honourable counsels and noble deeds; that is why the mind is the interpreter of what constitutes the happy life. Now sagacity, or reason that has control over passion, is better than passion, and what judges is more excellent than what is subject to judgement. Nor is it possible that the non-rational be better than reason. 2. Ennead I. 4 [46] 4. 1–22: If, then, a human being is able to have the perfect life, a man who has this life is eudaimōn. If not, one would have to set eudaimonia among the gods, [if] such a life [belongs] to them alone. Yet since we say that this eudaimonia exists also among human beings, we must consider how this is so. I mean this: it is clear from other considerations that man has perfect life through having not only sense-perception, but also reasoning, and true noetic [activity]. But does he have this as something other than himself? No, he is not really a man if he does not have this either potentially or in actuality, which we say constitutes eudaimonia. But will we say that he has this species of life, this perfect life, in him as a part of him? The other man who has this as a part, has it [eudaimonia] potentially, but the man who is now in [possession of] eudaimonia, who is this in actuality, has passed into it, and is this. The other things now [merely] clothe him; one would say that they

are not part of him because he does not want them to surround him. They would be his if they were connected to him through an act of will. What then is the good for this man? He himself [is the good] for himself by virtue of what he has. The transcendent cause [the Good] is [the cause] of the good in him and is in another way good, present to him in another way. There is evidence for this in that the one who has [the good] in this way does not seek to be anything else. For what indeed would he look for? JHL 1.7.29-30: The happy life, then, does exist among men, but I mean only in those in whom life has been made perfect. Now the perfect life is not that of the senses, but the life of reason, lived according to management exercised by the reason and natural vigour possessed by the mind. In this there is found, not a part of man, but his completion, which appears not so much in his status as in his actions, and these, after all, make a man happy. To such a man, what is good but he himself? This good he possesses, this good is with him, and it will be the source of future goods for him ... And so the man who has been made perfect seeks nothing else but the only and admirable good. 3. Ennead I. 4 [46] 5.1-2: But what about pains and illness, and in general that which impedes activity? JHL 1.8.37: But perhaps someone may suppose that illness and bodily weakness are a hindrance to fulfilling the work of perfection, in that the works and accomplishments of one's hands cannot continue. 4. Ennead I. 4 [46] 6.1-7: But if our account taught that eudaimonia [depended on] not being in pain or ill or unfortunate or falling into great disasters, eudaimonia would not be [possible], whenever any of these contraries were present. But if this [eudaimonia] lies in possession of the true good, why is it necessary to put it aside, and looking towards it, to seek other things by which to judge eudaimonia, [other things] which do not count towards eudaimonia? JHL 1.7.32: For if the definition were such that the happy life was the one that could be found free and clear of unfortunate occurrences, surely someone could not be termed happy if such occurrences came to pass. And so such matters have been put aside, and in judging of the happy life only this is demanded, that the definition of it should consist in nothing else but the possession of the true and the good. For the man who has this despises all other things and has no need of them. 5. Ennead I. 4 [46] 7. 1-8: Why, therefore, does the eudaimōn wish these things to be present and reject their opposites? We will say that it is not because they bring any addition to eudaimonia, but rather to his existence. [He avoids] the opposite of these [necessities] either because [they contribute] towards non-existence or because being present they disturb the end, not through taking it away, but because the one who has the best, wants to have this alone, not something else with it, which, whenever present, doesn't take it away, but nevertheless also exists beside it. JHL 1. 8. 34-5: Although the presence or absence of external advantages and bodily joys usually does not take anything from virtue or add anything to it ... For accidentals, which cannot increase happiness, do not lessen it, because the only good remains full and inviolable; Virtue that has been perfected remains always amid adversities and pleasures, adversities do not take anything away from its perfection, nor do pleasures add anything. 6. Ennead I. 4 [46] 7. 28-34: And if he should be unburied, his body will rot anyway both under and above the ground. And if [it is a concern] that he is buried inexpensively and without name, not being thought worthy of a lofty memorial, how trivial! And if he should be led off as a captive, the exit is there for him, if he cannot achieve eudaimonia. And if his own relations should be enslaved, for example, if daughters-in-law and daughters were to be dragged off — what, then, would we say, if he had died not having seen such a thing? JHL 1. 8. 36: He will not consider himself wretched either if he or his children fall into captivity, something that is reckoned a grave misfortune by most men ... He is not weak in regard to wrongs done to his own, nor anxious about the burial of his body. 7. Ennead I. 4 [46] 8. 2-5: But he will not be pitied even in his pain, since there is splendour inside him, like the light in a lamp when a terrific gale blows outside in a great tumult of wind and storm. JHL 1. 8. 36: Although he fights with the most severe pain, he does not show himself wretched but reveals a strength of spirit that shines like a light in a lantern even amid rough storms and winds of the greatest severity, a strength that cannot be quenched. 8. Ennead I. 4 [46] 8. 24-5: For one must not [live] in an untrained manner, but like a great combatant be in a state to ward off fortune's blows. JHL 1. 8. 36: Rather, like a strong athlete, he matches blow for blow the man lashing him. 9. Ennead I. 4 [46] 9. 18-23: If thinking and wisdom were imported [from outside Nous], this argument would perhaps make sense; but if the essential nature of

wisdom is in a substance, or rather in the substance, and this substance is not destroyed in someone sleeping, or, in general, in what is called not conscious to oneself; this activity of the substance is in him and such an activity is sleepless, then the spoudaios, in that he is a spoudaios, would be active even then. JHL 1. 8. 39: What indeed is lacking to the man who possesses the good and has virtue always as his companion and ally? ... In what quiet of sleep not active? Even when he is asleep, his own virtue does not forsake him ... He is no less happy ... when he sleeps than when he is awake, because he is no less safe and sound when sleeping than when he is awake. 10. Ennead I. 4 [46] 16. 20–7: So that some of his activities will contribute to eudaimonia, but others will not be for the sake of the end, and not really for him [the spoudaios] but for what is attached to him, which he will care for and put up with, while he is able, like a musician with a lyre, while he is able to use it, but if he is not able to use it he will exchange it for another, or he will abandon using the lyre and he will give up the activity directed to it, having another task now not requiring a lyre and he will ignore it lying nearby singing now without an instrument. JHL 1. 8. 39: If a man who has been accustomed to sing to the accompaniment of a harp should find the harp shattered and broken and its strings undone and the use of it interrupted, he would put it aside and not call for its measures but would delight himself with his own voice. Just so will such a man as we have here allow the harp that is his body to lie unused. (p. 201-204)

Contexte du commentaire

- ◆ Annexe 1.

— Mots-clés —

Français

- ◆ bonheur
- ◆ perfection

— Liens —

- ◆ Plotin/Chrétiens : problématique commune aux deux auteurs.

— Auteurs secondaires —

Auteur ancien 1 mis en relation dans le commentaire supra cité

- ◆ Saint Ambroise , *Jacob and the Happy Life*, § 6, 24 - § 8, 39

Datation

- ◆ Entre 340 et 397.

Auteur ancien 2 mis en relation dans le commentaire supra cité

- ◆ Plotin, *Traité 46 (I, 4)*, *Sur le bonheur*

Datation

- ◆ Entre 269 et 269.

— Rédaction de la fiche —

Rédacteur de la fiche

- ♦ Soares Santoprete, L. G., fiche numéro 152, 02-08-2018 18:37:50.

Comment citer cette fiche

- ♦ Soares Santoprete, L. G., *McGroarty, 2006, p. 201-204, Traité 46, bonheur, perfection, 02-08-2018 18:37:50, fiche numéro 152*, [en ligne]. Paris : CNRS, http://philognose.org/?page_id=300&idfiche=152

Imprimer